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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent desires to state additional facts supplementing the statement of facts of the appellant.
PHYSICAL LOCATION OF RIGHT OF wAY:

The right of way acquired by the respondents by the
warranty deed marked exhibit "B", was 11 feet North ahd
South and 160 East and West. The Surveyor, Maxwell,
testified that the physical location of the said right of
way, was over the North 11 feet of the Wood property
and comes right up to the \Vilkinson line (Tr. 6). The
defendant, Carlos Wood, testified that the right of way
was measured and intended to be over to the property line
of Wilkinson (Tr. 76-77).
LocATION OF BuiLDINGS WITH RESPECT TO HIGHWAY:

The building of Mr. Wood is situated 25.8 feet West
of the highway property line. The front of the Wilkinson
building is jogged so that the North front portion is set
back from the highway line 25.8 feet and the South portion is set back an additional 55 feet as shown by plaintiff's exhibit "A", the survey plat.
Carlos Wood testified that so far as he was concerned, the area between the buildings and the highway
and East from the block wall to the highway was always
intended to be open and unobstructed and there was no
attempt to designate any entrance to the right of \vay at
any point between the highway line and the front of the
building (Tr. 88-89).
3
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Finley Wilkinson testified that at the time the construction was commenced on the wall by the defendant,
he was out of town and immediately upon his return he
noticed that the wall was being constructed and the first
row of blocks was being laid; that he had a conversation
with the defendant at that time and told the defendant to
stop construction; that the defendant continued the construction thereafter (Tr. 33-34). That exhibit "D" and
"E" were notices served upon the contractor and Mr.
Wood to discontinue construction of the wall (Tr. 51-52).
The defendant, Carlos Wood testified that he had a con~
versation with Harold Wilkinson at the time the footings
were placed, which conversation was as follows (Tr. 8384):

"Q.

Now, you said that at the time you constructed-that you began the construction on
the block wall you had a conversation with
Harold Wilkinson~
....\.. Yes, sir.

At the time the footings 'Yere just in?
A. We had just put the footings in.
Q.

Didn't he tell you to stop construction on it-?
A. No, not exactly. In fact 'Ye got together on the
height of the "Tall, and about "There it 'vould
go.
Q.

Well, you said not exactlY, did he tell You to
go ahead and build the 'v~ll '?
•
A. No. He didn't use those \Vords. He didn ,t tell
rne to stop building the 'Yall.
Q.

4
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Q.
A.

Did he say he approved of the wall~
No, I don't think he did. At first we had quite
a conversation. Harold and I talked together
for two or three nights and at one time we did
get together on about how high I should put
the wall and step it down. I vvas going out to
'vhere the pipe was in the first place, and he
talked me into staying back aways.

At any time did he consent that you build
the 'vall~
A. That I don't knovv. In his words, he didn't tell
me that."

Q.

UsE OF RIGHT OF WAY BEFORE OBSTRUCTION:

Finley Wilkinson testified that by warranty deed
dated November 30, 1953, 'vhich was plaintiffs' exhibit
"B", plaintiffs acquired the right of way in question together with a tract in rear of his building 52 feet by 256.66
feet ( Tr. 23). That there was no obstruction which \\Tould
prevent entry upon the right of way at any point from
the Wilkinson property beginning at the highway and
extending Westerly about 80 feet to the Wilkinson building ( Tr. 26) ; that about a year after the right of way
was acquired, the defendant erected three steel posts
about five feet apart along the North line of the right
of way and about in line with the front of the building
(Tr. 27) ; that even after the erection of the steel posts the
plaintiffs continued to go between the posts and the Wilkinson building to enter the right of 'vay (Tr. 27); that
to restrict the plaintiff from crossing on to the right of
way where they had so crossed before the construction of
5
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the block wall vvas inconvenient, and an unreasonable restriction upon the use by the plaintiff, in that the wrecker
has difficulty entering the restricted area; every vehicle
of the plaintiffs which must be moved to the back lot must
travel to the specific entrance between the Wood building
and the block wall; the customers of the plaintiff have
had difficulty in using the right of way and at least two
customers have hit the block vvall, causing damage to their
automobile; that the automobiles of customers must be
driven to the rear parking area by the plaintiffs or employees of the plaintiffs because the custo1ners object to
use of the narrow alley, ( Tr. 28) ; that the situation now
\Vith the block wall erected it is possible for one vehicle
to park at the restricted entrance and effectively block
the whole right of way, whereas before the plaintiff could
enter and leave the right of \Yay from the plaintiffs' property along where the block vvall is no\Y constructed (Tr.
:29); it costs the plaintiffs extra m.oney and time in having to traverse the lot to enter at the restricted entrance
(Tr. 31), and that it is more of a hazard because of congestion on the highway and the approaches from the
highway to require vehicles to enter only from the restricted entrance \Yhereas before it \Yas not necessary to
even travel East of the building line in order to enter the
right of way (Tr. 31). That ~Ir. \\' ood rarely used this
particular right of \Yay since ~fr. \\. . ood has approaches
on the South side of his building \Yhirh are pri1narily used
as his entrance (Tr. 30). That son1e tilne in Noven1ber,
1954, defendant erected the three steel posts and that
Finley Wilkinson called his attorney, Harold \\'ilkinson
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and was advised that since Mr. Wood was a neighbor and
would be in business there ·a long time, it \vould be better
not to stir up any trouble unless something worse happened, and to just let it go ( Tr. 49).
Carlos Wood testified that he erected the three steel
posts about four or five feet apart so that the three posts
occupied a space of about 10 feet along the North line of
the right of way (Tr. 74-75); that Mr. Wilkinson uses the
subject right of way more than the defendant does, and
\vould be just as interested in keeping the right of way
open as would the defendant (Tr. 78); that Wood has
about 70 or 80 feet on the South side of the building \vhich
can be used as an approach to the rear of the Wood property, and is so used (Tr. 77, (Tr. 64).
REASONS DEFENDANT CoxsTRUCTED THE WALL :

Defendant Wood testified that his reasons for building the \vall were about as follows:
a. To make a definite right of way down through
the two businesses to separate the businesses (Tr. 64).
b. To remedy a parking problem, although, defendant had not placed signs or other\vise marked, or painted
a designated right of \vay and, presently, \vith the \vall
constructed, one car parked at the restricted entrance effectively blocks the whole right of way ( Tr. 79).
c. To prevent ruts in the right of way, although
there are no ruts now after black topping (Tr. 81).
d. To prevent spilling of oil on the drive vvay, although l\fr. Wood never mentioned to ~Ir. Wilkinson
about the oil being poured on the drive way (Tr. 83).
7
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e. To make it possible to level the drive way, although the drive way could be leveled and black topped
without the erection of the wall (Tr. 86).
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PROPERTY :

The defendant Carlos Wood testified that the negotiations concerning the purchase of the right of way and
the sale of rear property, transpired in October of 1953
(Tr. 58); that the negotiations commenced after a resurvey raised some question as to the location of the
West end of the vVilkinson building (Tr. 58) ; that Charles
0. Dunn was the owner of the Wood property \Yhich :\Ir.
Wood was buying under contract, and that :Jir. Dunn who
is an attorney and a real estate man joined in the negotiations (Tr. 72-74).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
IN CONSTRUING EASEMENTS THE INTENTION OF
THE PARTIES IS PARAMOUNT. SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 1, WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY
TO DETERMINE THE MATTER OF INTENTION.
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT FOR NOl\IINAL D.A:\I.AGES W.AS
PROPER.
POINT III.
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE CHANGED AS TO LOCATION WITHOUT MUTUAL CONSENT OF SERVIENT AND
DOMINANT OWNER.

8
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POINT IV.
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE OBSTRUCTED BY
FENCES OR OTHER MEANS WITHOUT PROOF OF NECESSITY FOR PRESERVATION OF SERVIENT ESTATE AND
'VITHOUT UNREASONABLE
INTERFERENCE
WITH
DOMINANT ESTATE.
POINT V.
THE ACT OF ONE TENANT IN COMMON DOES NOT
BIND HIS COTENANTS IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC
AUTHORITY.
ARGli~IENT

POINT I.
IN CONSTRUING EASEMENTS, THE INTENTION OF
THE PARTIES IS PARAMOUNT. SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 1, WAS PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY
TO DETERMINE THE MATTER OF INTENTION.

The rule of construction of instruments creating
easements in land is set forth in the opinion of this court
in the case of Stevens, et al. v. Bird-J ex Company, 81 U.
355, 18 P. 2d 292, as follows:
Hin construing instruments creating easements in land, the court will look to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation
of the parties, the state of the thing granted, and
the object to be attained, to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the parties.''
In the instant case the plaintiffs purchased from the
defendant a tract of land 52 feet wide by 256.66 feet, as
shown on exhibit "C" in yellow ( Tr. 57). These negotiations beginning in October 1953, for the purchase of this
tract, followed a discrepancy in surveys under -w-hir It the
9
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Wilkinson building would have encroached on the tract
shown in yellow (Tr. 58). The land in rear was acquired
by the plaintiff for the purpose of parking automobiles
left with the plaintiffs for the purpose of repair or storage, and the right of way was for the use in taking automobiles to and from the shop building, which has only an
East entrance, to the parking area in rear (Tr. 25). There
was no obstruction which would prevent access to the
right of way any where along where the present block
wall is constructed at the time the parking area \Yas acquired by the plaintiffs (Tr. 26), until about a year after
acquisition of the property by the plaintiffs. The defendant installed three steel posts as shown on exhibit "C",
which would occupy about 10 feet along the right of "~ay.
The defendant testified that prior to the purchase of the
rear property by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs \Yere using
the right of way for parking of vehicles in rear (Tr. 63).,
and while the defendant stated that the three steel posts
were in place at the time of the purchase~ he further
testified that the plaintiffs immediately began use of the
right of way because they needed it, and that they would
come from the side, using the drive "~ay "side\\~ays. ·~ ( Tr.
63). The defendant further confirn1ed ''That Finley \\. . ilkinson had previously stated, that the rear area "\Yas used
to park cars of customers and en1ployees. and that the
use of the right of way by \-Vilkinsons "\Yas n1ore extensive
than the use by the defendant (Tr. 6±).
The Warranty Deed conYe~~ing the rear property and
the right of \\Tay states, "together \Yith a right of \Yay oYer
and through the follo,ving described property:·· and then

10
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follows the description of the right of way, by metes and
bounds. There is nothing in the instrument which would
indicate that the right of way was restricted only to ingress and egress or that it was restricted as to entrance
from any point along the plaintiff's boundary. As set
forth in the respondent's statement of facts, the defendant, himself, testified that the entire right of way was intended to be open extending from the East line of the
buildings to the highway, which specifically negatives any
inference that the entrance was to be restricted to 11 feet
immediately at the highway. In fact, all of the testimony
indicated that it would be practically impossible and not
\vithin the intention of either of the parties that the entrance be restricted to 11 feet at the highway. Under
these circumstances, the question then of the intention
of the parties as to whether or not there was to be any
restriction upon plaintiffs' entrance on to the right of \vay
becomes important. The interrogatory submitted to the
jury clearly resolves the question of intention of the
parties as to the matter of intention that the access from
the plaintiffs' side would be unrestricted. Even after
the erection of the three steel posts which the plaintiffs
did not protest in the interest of maintaining good relations with their neighbor, the plaintiffs still had about
-±0 feet of open passageway West of the steel posts.
The case of Alrnada, et al. v. Superior Conrt in aud
for Napa County, a California case, 149 P.2d 61, defines

the phrase "right of way" as follows :
11
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"\V.ebster's New International Dictionary defines a right of way as 'a right of passage over another person's land.' And this definition has been
so universally incorporated into innumerable decisions that it may be said to be generally accepted.
Sometiines it is a right of \vay for a road, sometimes for a ditch, son1etimes for a canal, but whatever the particular right of way may be for, it is a
right of passage over another person's land, or,
in other words, an easement to use the land of
another for such particular purpose. See 54 C.J.
824. As was said in the case of San Pedro, etc., R.
Co. v. Pillsbury, 23 ·Cal. App. 675, at page 680, 139
P. 669, 671: 'The term "right of way" denotes the
tenure by which land is held; it is descriptive of
the easement right and not of the land to which it
is affixed.' "
In the early case of K ripp v. Cttrtis, 71 Cal. 62, at
page 63, 11 P. 879, the court said:
"The privilege \Yhich one person, or particular
description of persons, may have of passing over
the land of another in some particular line is termed a right of way."
The following statement is taken fron1 a decision of
this court in the case of Clawson v. TT.,. allace. 16 l~. 300, at
page 306:
"The right of travel over another's land 1nay
be deno1ninated an 'easen1ent' or 'right of \Yay.' ''
The appellant seeks to place a restriction on the use
of the drivevvay 1nerely for purposes ingress and egress,
and ,vjth a restricted entranee of 11 feet at the high\Yay,
all of which is contrary to the language of the instrun1ent

12
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creating the right of way and to the intention of the parties at the time of the creation of the easement.
It would be more consistent and in accordance with
the intention of the parties if the two eleven foot ends
'vere blocked or fenced rather than to block or fence the
North and South boundaries of the right of way, in that
it would be a rare exception for any vehicle to enter at the
eleven foot end near the highway, since this approach is
impractical and was never contemplated by either of the
parties.
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES WAS
PROPER.
The jury saw fit to R\vard no damages to the plaintiffs, and a reasonable inference is that they failed to
award substantial damages for the reason that the defendant would be confronted with the expense for the wall
which would have to be removed, and the jury may have
concluded that the interests of the plaintiffs would have
been satisfied by the removal of the wall.
At any rate the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal
damages to protect their substantial right to the use of an
unobstructed easement. In the case of Gotttld v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah ~d 187,
this court held, "N on1inal da1nages is a trivial su1n such
as one cent or one dollar R\varded to a plain tiff \vhose
legal right has been invaded but who has failed to prove
any compensatory damages."
Also in the case of N asner v. Buton, 2 lJ tah 2d 236,
this court held as follows:

13
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"An unexcused failure to perform a contract
is a legal wrong. Action will lie for the breach although it causes no injury. Nominal damages are
then awarded . . . Even though a breach of contract benefits a plaintiff, he can, nevertheless~
recover nominal damages."
The plaintiff had a substantial right which required
protection anq the award of nominal damages by the
court was entirely proper.
POINT III.
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE CHANGED AS TO LO·CATION WITHOUT MUTUAL CONSENT OF SERVIENT AND
DOMINANT OWNERS.

The evidence 'vas undisputed that the right of 'Yay
granted by the defendant to the plaintiffs "\Yas to adjoin
and abut the property of the plaintiffs for a \\idth of
11 feet. The defendant in construction of an 8 inch block
wall, having a 9 inch cap and located "\Yithin the described
right of way, has either obstructed the right of way or
changed the location of the right of 'Yay "ithout the consent of the plaintiffs or both. The defendant in arguing
that he could still 1nake available a \\Tidth of 11 feet bet\\Teen the \\Tall and the building~ if true~ 'Yould runount to
a change of location of the right of 'Yay "Tithout the eonsent of the plaintiffs.
The case of Sta1natis Y. J oh11sou, :2:2-± P.:2d :201~ . .\rizona 1950, states the follo"\Ying \\ith respect to change of
location of an easen1ent:

14
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~·

"The general and almost universal rule with
reference to change in the location of an easement
after the location has once been definitely established, regardless of whether it has been acquired
by grant or prescription, is laid down as follows
in 17 Am. Jur., Easements, Section 87: 'The general rule is that the location of an easement once
selected cannot be changed by either the landowner or the easement owner without the other's
consent. The reason for this rule is that treating
the location as variable would incite litigation and
depreciate the value and diseourage the improveInent of the land upon which the easement is
charged. Accordingly, a definite location of an
easement determines and limits the right of the
gran tee so that he cannot again exercise a choice.
Similarly, a definite location binds the grantor so
that he has no right either to hinder the grantee in
the exercise of his right to compel him to accept
another location, although the latter location may
be equally convenient with the right or privilege
originally granted. Furthermore, many courts hold
that a right of way by prescription, which runs
in a definite course to a fixed point, is no more
subject to change by parol agreement or by acts or
conduct than if it had been created and so described by deed. The location, however, may be
changed with the express or implied consent of
both parties, and an estoppel to claim a .former location to be the true one arises from acquiescence
in a change.' The rules are stated as follows in 28
C.J.S., Easements, §84. 'As a general rule, in
the absence of statutes to the contrary, the location
of an easement cannot be changed by either party
without the other's consent, after it has been once
established either by the express terms of the
grant or by the acts of the parties, except under

15
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the authority of an express or implied grant or
reservation to this effect. It is competent, ho,vever,
for the parties to change the location by mutual
consent, and such consent may be implied from
their acts and acquiescence. After a change has
been made by mutual consent, the general rule
again operates to prevent a further change of location by either party without the other's consent.' "
In the case of Yottngstown Steel Products Co. of Cal.
v. City of Los Angeles7 et al. 7 California 1952, 2-±0 P.2d
977, where the city had maintained a po,Yer line at a
height of 51¥2 feet, and the plaintiff sought to compel
them to raise the height to at least 61 feet, the court in
holding that the easement could not be changed \\ithout
the consent of the parties stated as follo\YS:
"vVhere the right of \Yay has been used at a
particular location \Yi th the acquieseence of the
servient o\vner, the parties have, in effect placed
their O\vn practical construction upon the grant,
and the easement "~ill be regarded as fixed at that
place.
''Once the location of an easement has been
finally established, \Yhether by express ter1ns of
the grant or by use and acquiescence~ it eannot be
substantially changed \Yithout the consent of both
parties.
''And the grantor has no right either to hinder
the grantee in his use of the \Yay or to ron1pel hnn
to aeeept another loeation, even though a ne\v location nla)~ be just as eonYenient."
The defendant atten1pted to change the loeation of
said rig·ht of \YaY in such a 1nanner "~hirh \vould seriouslY
<

•

•
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inconvenience the plaintiffs, and which would seem to be
clearly contrary to the rules of law set forth above.
POINT IV.
AN EASEMENT CANNOT BE OBSTRUCTED BY
FENCES OR OTHER MEANS WITHOUT PROOF OF NECESSITY FOR PRESERVATION OF SERVIENT ESTATE AND
INTERFERENCE WITH
WITHOUT UNREASONABLE
DOMINANT ESTATE.

An analysis of the reasons advanced by the defendant, Wood, for building the block wall would indicate that
the same was constructed more for the purpose of inconveniencing the plaintiff than for the convenience of the
defendant.
One reason advanced by the defendant for the construction of the wall was that it made a definite right of
\Vay down through the two businesses to separate the
businesses ( Tr. 64). An examination of the photos and
other exhibits indicates that prior to the erection of the
\vall, the businesses were sufficiently separated and individually identified. If the evidence had shown that the
plaintiffs were encroaching South onto the other property
of the defendant, it may have indicated a justification
on the part of the defendant to erect a wall on the South
side Df the right of way, but the erection of the wall on the
North side of the right of way does nothing to protect
the property of the defendant. None of the remaining
property of the defendant was fenced.
The defendant said that the wall was constructed also
because of the parking problem (Tr. 79) in that vehicles
were parked on the right of way by customers of the

17
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plaintiffs and defendant. It was readily admitted by the
defendant that the plaintiffs used the right of way more
than the defendant did, and that this right of way was
the only one available to the plaintiffs, so that the plaintiffs would be more interested in keeping the right of \vay
open than would the defendant. By constructing a \vall
the defendant so restricted the right of way that one
vehicle parked near the restricted 11 foot entrance, could
effectively block the entire right of \Yay, "Thereas prior
thereto, it was possible to pass on and off of the right
of way anywhere along where the block \vall is presently
constructed. The construction of the block wall added to
the congestion of the right of way, and increased the
haza.rd by reducing visibility and maneuverability.
The defendant said the construction of the \Vall prevented ruts in the right of "~ay, (Tr. 81) although this
was corrected by black topping. It \Yould further seen1
that a restricted entrance would give rise to more ruts
than would an unrestricted entrance, \vhich \Yould divide
the traffic.
The defendant said the erection of the \vall \vas to
prevent spilling of oil on the drive \Yay (Tr. 83), although
he had never mentioned to the plaintiffs about the oil
being poured on the drive\Yay. The fact that the plaintiffs had a greater use of the right of \\~ay in taking their
cars and customers cars to the rear parking area, the
plaintiffs \vould be just as interested in keeping the right
of \vay free from any 1naterial \vhieh could blen1ish the
automobiles or carry debris on to the shop floor, as \vould
the defendant.
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The defendant said that the wall would make possible
leveling of the right of way (Tr. 86), although he admitted that even with out the erection of the wall there
could be substantial leveling of the right of way which
\\"Ould permit the use of the right of way by the plaintiffs
as prior to the erection of the wall.
We fair to see any reason advanced by the defendant
"vhich would show the necessity for construction of the
,)lock wall for the purpose of preserving his own property.
The case of Bolton et al. v. Murphy, et al., 41 Utah
591, 127 Pac. 335, at page 603, comments on this propo~i tion as follows :
~'Appellants also insist that the court erred
in per1nitting respondents to maintain a bar or
gate at or near the point where the road in question departs from the highway and enters onto
their land, and at other points along the road east
thereof. The evidence is again conclusive that, if
appellants have any right to pass onto respondents' land from the highway, they have such right
without any interference whatever. Nor can we
see why respondents desire to p)ace a bar or gate
at that point, or at any point along the road as it
passes over their land, since they have no fence
along the west end thereof along the highway at
all. But, even if they had put up such a fence, they
cannot, at this late date, be permitted, without the
consent of appellants, to put up bars or gates,
at least not without showing that such obstructions
are necessary for the preservation and proper and
efficient use of their lands, which is the servient
estate."
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By erecting the block wall the defendant actually created a burden and a hazard upon himself and his property in that by channelizing the right of way he has obstructed visibility and has created a situation where the
right of way is more readily blocked, and can be effectively blocked by only one vehicle.
The situation here is such that the same number of
vehicles will use the right of way \vhether the entrance
is restricted or unrestricted, but a restricted entrance
makes for congested traffic and inconvenience to both
parties.
The plaintiff was granted a specific right of "~ay
in a definite location, described by metes and bounds,
and situated immediately adjoining plaintiff's property.
It would seem that anything which prevented the plaintiffs from traversing the entire surface of the described
right of way is an obstruction which \vas not contemplated
by the grant. The block wall deprives the plaintiffs of the
use of the most important nine inches of the entire \vidth
of the right of way.
Appellant cites Dyba v. Boro'lcit.z) as n1eeting the crux
of the issue head_ on. An analysis of the facts in that
case shows circumstances quite different fron1 the instant case. First, in the Dyba rase the "Tording of the
grant was limited as follows:
"Together \vith the right of ingress. egress
and regress ... through and oYer an alley t\vo and
ninety-six one hundredths (:2.96/100) feet \Vide
extending back in a \Yesterly direction to the rear
of the building ereeted upon the adjoining propPrty on the North along the line of this property.·'
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Secondly, in the Dyba case, the first 32 feet of the alley
was bounded by a 9 inch party wall on the South side
and by a house on the North side, thus the right of way
was never designated or required to abut the dominant
property. The right of way in the Dyba case was 2.96
feet wide and provided ingress, egress -and regress, to the
dominant estate and apparently continued to be 2.96 feet
wide even after erection of the fence since the fence extended along the party wall. However, in the instant case
the right of way was designated and intended to abut
the dominant property and was never intended to be restricted to "ingress, egress and regress" through an 11
foot alley, but was a right of way over and through the
tract 11 feet wide by 160 feet long.
The court in the Dyba case states the rule of construction that "To ascertain the intention we must look
to the circumstances attending the grant."
In the case of Houghtalling v. Stoothoff, 19 N.Y.S. 2d
510 cited by the appellant, the court in a brief one paragraph opinion also included this important sentence that
"The court found that the fence does not encroach upon
the right of way:." This language of the opinion infers
that had the fence encroached upon the right of way it
would have been required to be removed.
The evidence showed that plaintiffs frequently have
to tow wrecked cars into the rear area by use of a wrecker, all of which requires space and an unobstructed approach. By narrowing the right of way nine inches and
by restricting the approach this use of wrecker is greatly
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affected, and is a much more serious situation than merely .driving car into and out of a driveway (Tr. 28).
POINT V.
THE ACT OF ONE TENANT IN COMMON DOES NOT
BIND HIS COTENANTS IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC
AUTH-ORITY.

The appellant in his brief on page 20, infers that one
of the respondents, Harold Wilkinson, at one time agreed
how high the wall should be placed, and refers to the
transcript, page 84. vV e have set forth in the statement
of facts, verbatim the co-nversation between Harold \\,..ilkinson and Carlos Wood as testified by Carlos \\:ood, and
we submit that nothing in the transcript indicates any
agreement by Harold Wilkinson to the construction of
the wall. In fact the testimony of Carlos \v·· ood negatived
any consent by IIarold Wilkinson to the construction of
the wall.
I-Iowever, even if it were assun1ed that Harold \V. ilkinson granted his consent in any particular, he "\Yas only
one of three co tenants as is shown by the \\,..arranty Deed,
exhibit "B", and his independent act could not affect a
\Yaiver or release of any interest of his co tenants. \\. .e
eite 14 American Jurisprudence, Sections 63, S±~ and 89~
\vhich state in substance that since no relationship of
agency exists between tenants in con1n1on, no one of then1
can ordinarily dispose of the interest of another in such
a ntanner as to be binding unless duly authorized to do so.
Furthern1ore, the defendant "\Yell kne"\Y that Finley
Wilkinson, not Harold. Wilkinson, "\Yas the person n1ost
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concerned since Finley was the owner-manager of the
auto business whose livelihood depended upon the auto
business. It is significant that the erection of the wall was
commenced while Finley vVilkinson was out of the state.

It is respectfully submitted that the court in the
exercise of its powers in equity should properly have required the removal of the entire block wall, which was
erected by the defendant upon the described right of way .
.A11 of the circumstances attending the grant of right of
\vay indicate that it was never intended that the right of
way be blocked along the boundary of the plaintiff, ~and
the answer of the jury to interrogatory number one eonfirms this fact.
The judgment of the trial court should be modified
to require the removal of the entire wall.
Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE K. FADEL
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents

Bountiful, Utah
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